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ABSTRACT
Android has dominated the mobile market for a few years now. Meanwhile, An-
droid has seen a sharper increase in malware. It is a matter of utmost urgency to
find a better way to detect Android malware.
In this thesis, we use static code analysis to extract the android application
security features and build classification models to detect Android malware. Our
permissions-based classification model can achieve 96.5% accuracy, 97.2% TPR and
95.5% TNR with lower overhead. By using multiple security metrics, the detection
rate increases to 99.3% accuracy, 99.5% TPR and 99% TNR.
Moreover, we investigate Android application security evolution. The data shows
that more than half applications have security vulnerabilities or dangerous behaviors.
Based on this result, we argue that there can be higher chance to impose update
attack, where, the malware is contained in the updated version of a benign application.
Our multiple-metrics based classification model is adapted to detect the update attack
and can achieve similar or even better performance based on our initial results.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
Android is a mobile operating system that is based on the Linux kernel. Its open
source nature attracts the interest of many companies and developers. However, this
open nature also contributes to many security threats. Last November, The Financial
Times (Thomas, 2014) released a report that more than 40% of UK businesses were
hit by mobile security breaches in the last year. The mobile security is a heated
subject currently.
To provide greater functionality, Android developers publish new versions of the
apps to keep their product alive. If the new version has better security than the old
one? This is the question we want to investigate.
Moreover, in the mobile market, Android shares 87% of the global smartphone
market in 2013. However, Android’s share of global mobile malware is an even larger
number: 97% (Kelly, 2014). These malware are found in not only the official market,
Google Play, but also in many third-party markets. Malware is the application which
is harmful or potentially harmful to users or their devices. Currently, the signature
technique of malware detection is not effective and has difficulty detecting zero-day
malware currently, because it is so changeable.
Based on these motivations, many research groups focus on Android security evo-
lution and malware detection. To show the security evolution, the researchers use
some special metrics to see the evolution, such as, permissions (Wei et al., 2012). In
malware detection, one of the research fields is using the data mining techniques to
2detect the malware. Using data mining techniques can have zero-day malware detec-
tion, since an unknown application can be classified as a suspicious application or a
benign application by using the built model. Recently, (Aung and Zaw, 2013) uses
all the requested permissions as the feature vectors to build the classification model.
The best performance is 91.6% accuracy, 91.6% TPR and 91.6% TNR. (Aafer et al.,
2013) uses the called APIs as the feature vectors to build the model with the best
performance of 96.5% accuracy, 97.2% True Positive Rate (TPR) and 95.5% True
Negative Rate(TNR).
To explain the Android application and improve the malware detection, we use the
crawler to download thousands of applications from the official market and the third-
party market in a period time. In the application set, we find 292 applications from
Google Play and 886 applications from the third-party market have multiple versions.
We use these samples to investigate the Android application security evolution, a
number of security metrics are defined based on the literature, we group them into
four categories, vulnerabilities, malicious behaviors, sensitive APIs and application
metadata. We find not all applications solve the potential security problems exposed
in the old version. On the contrary, many applications have more vulnerabilities or
the malicious behaviors in the updated version.
Then we use the classification algorithms to detect the malware. We compare
the performance of using the requested permissions with the used permissions to do
the classification. Different from (Aung and Zaw, 2013), we rank the permissions by
percentage difference between malware and benign applications. Then we use four
classifiers to find the best model. The similar best performance is achieved by using
the top 40 requested permissions and the top 25 requested permissions of using the
IBK classifier. The best performance of using the requested permissions is 96.5%
accuracy, 97.2% TPR and 95.5% TNR. One of the benefits of using the requested
3permissions approach, it is really fast.
Then we use more security metrics to do the malware detection and check if the
performance can be improved. The multiple metrics include the vulnerabilities, the
dangerous behaviors, the sensitive APIs besides the requested permissions. The best
performance is 99.3% accuracy, 99.5% TPR and 99% TNR with IBK classifier. This
model is not only applied in the Google Play market, but also in the third-party
market.
Since the result of application evolution is not optimistic, we take a look at the
update attack detection. Update attack is a new type of attack where the malicious
code is contained in the update components of a legitimate application. As most
applications are set to automatically update, this new attack is harder to detect
and will induce more users to install the malicious code. We use machine learning
classifiers to detect this attack based on the difference between application versions
in various security metrics. And we also try to see if we use the old versions as the
training dataset to build the classification model, it can detect the malware from the
new versions more accurately. The answer is YES. When we use this method, the
TNR reaches to ”1” in the Google Play market, which means our model classifies all
the malware from the test dataset correctly.
In summary, our contributions include:
• We use multiple methods to improve the performance of malware classifica-
tion. When we use multiple metrics to do the classification in the Google Play
market, our best model can reach 99.3% accuracy, 99.5% TPR and 99% TNR,
which is much higher than others work. What’s more, the applications sources
are from both the official market and the third-party market. To the best of
our knowledge, this’s the first time that permissions, APIs, vulnerabilities and
dangerous behaviors have been used together to detect Android malware.
4• We have implemented an Android cross-version application analysis tool and
using this tool to investigate the application evolution in the Google Play and
the third-party market. We find that the security issues have not gotten enough
attention by developers. Consequently, the results are not optimistic. More than
half of applications have one or more vulnerabilities or dangerous behaviors and
many of them remain the same problems in the updated version.
• We propose two methods to detect update attacks, the malware detection rate
increases to 100% and 99.7%, which proves that our models can classify the
malware correctly.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents the Android ar-
chitecture, installation and update process, security mechanisms, malware and some
data mining techniques. Chapter 3 provides all metrics which are used to present
an Android application. Then, chapter 4 shows the application evolution analysis of
security. After that, chapter 5 illustrates the results of application evolution. Chap-
ter 6 shows the performance of using the requested permissions and using the used
permissions to do the classification. Chapter 7 provides the classification performance
of using multiple metrics, followed by the detection of update attack in chapter 8.
Chapter 9 discusses some related work. Finally, chapter 10 explains the future work
and chapter 11 concludes this paper.
5Chapter 2
Background
This chapter introduces the Android architecture, installation and update process,
the Android security mechanisms, malware and some data mining techniques which
are widely used in the malware detection.
2.1 Android Architecture
The Android operating system has four layers with five parts as shown in Figure 2·1.
Each layer has its own functionality.
Figure 2·1: Android system architecture (Android Developers, )
6Android has the Linux kernel at the bottom of the layers. This layer provides
the basic function, such as IPC (inter-process communication), device management,
memory management and so on.
Native libraries are in the second layer from the bottom. It provides a set of
libraries written in C or C++. For example, SQLite database is a kind of native
library, which is used to store the application data.
Android runtime is also in the second layer. Android uses the DVM (Dalvik
Virtual Machine) sandbox to support its application sandbox. It’s optimized for
low power and small memory, which is desirable for mobile devices. This layer also
provides a set of core Java libraries.
The application framework is the third layer. It provides many higher-level ser-
vices to the application layer.
Application layer is the top layer in Android architecture. Some pre-installed ap-
plications are installed on every device. Users can also install additional applications
in this layer. The applications can come from the official market or the third-party
markets.
2.2 Application Installation and Update Process
The Android application installation and update process mainly consist of three steps.
After an APK file is downloaded and ready, the first step is to decide whether this
application is a new application or an updated version. The second step is to assign
the user id (UID) and the last step is to assign the permissions.
2.2.1 Application Installation
Android Operating System (OS) should verify that the APK file has not been modified
by others before installation (Barrera et al., 2012). After this, the OS should check
the manifest if the package name is different from other package names which have
7been already installed, or if this package name is new, this installation is considered
as an initial installation.
In the UID assignment step, sharing UID is checked in the manifest. If the sharing
UID exists, Android checks other applications’ shareUserId. If they match to each
other, this application is assigned with the existing UID. If no applications match or
no sharing UID in the manifest, a new UID is assigned to this application.
In the permission assignment step, if the UID is new, this UID will have all
permissions requested in the manifest if the users approve. If the UID is shared, this
application will not only have its own requested permissions, but also the permissions
of other applications with the same UID.
2.2.2 Application Update
After validating APK file, if the package name is the same as the name of installed
applications on the device, this application is considered as an updated version.
In the UID assignment step, the new version has the same UID as the old version.
In the permission assignment step, if the new version doesn’t ask for new permis-
sions, no permissions would be shown on the user’s screen. Otherwise the user needs
to grant the new permissions to the new version. After the permission assignment
step, the old installed version will be removed and the new updated version will be
installed. Most applications are set to automatically update.
2.3 Android Security Mechanisms
This section provides an overview of the Android security mechanisms. Android se-
curity focuses primarily on protecting user data, system resources and application
isolation (Android Developers, ). To achieve these goals, Android provides the fol-
lowing features, sandbox, secure ICC (inter-component Communication), application
signing and permission model.
82.3.1 Sandbox
Application sandbox is a means to isolate the applications from each other in the
Android system by assigning a UID and a set of permissions.
When the application is installed on the device, it runs in its own sandbox and
other applications cannot access or interfere. An application can only access its
own files, unless other applications explicitly assign the access permissions to this
application. For example, if the applications are created by the same developers, the
developers can make these applications share the same UID, then these applications
will run in the same sandbox and share the resources in that sandbox.
2.3.2 Inter-Component Communication
Android application consists of components. There are four kinds of components,
activities, services, broadcasts and providers. Android platform provides a secure
ICC that is similar to IPC to the Unix system.
ICC is provided by the binder mechanism which is in the middleware layer of
Android. The binder is a remote procedure call that is from a custom Linux driver
(Android Developers, ). ICC is achieved by intents. An intent is a message that
shows the target with some data optionally. It can be used in explicit communication
if it identifies the name of the receiver, or used in the implicit communication that
let the receiver see if it can access this intent or not.
2.3.3 Application Signing
Application signing is used to ensure the application security. It creates a certification
between developers and their applications.
Before placing an application into its sandbox, the application signing creates
a relationship between the UID and the application. The applications couldn’t be
run on the Android without signing. With the same UID, that is, running in the
9same sandbox, the applications can share the permissions and communicate with
each other.
By using application signing, the application update process can be simplified.
Since different versions of the same application have the same certificate, the package
manager can verify this certificate. Then, the old version is replaced, the new version
can have the permissions already granted to the old version. What’s more, the appli-
cation signing can also ensure that an application cannot communicate with another
unless using the ICC. But if the author is the same, the author can use the same
application signing to enable the direct communication among his/her applications.
2.3.4 Permission Model
The application is isolated when running in the sandbox. When it wants to access
some sensitive features, such as camera, location, telephony, network. Android pro-
vides a permission model to achieve this goal.
Permissions mechanism is used to make some restrictions when the applications
want to access the sensitive APIs of the operating system.
An application can declare which permissions it needs in the manifest. Before the
application is installed on the device, the system will ask the users if they grant the
permissions to this application. If the users agree to grant all requested permissions
to the application, the installation continues, otherwise, the installation cancels. Un-
like iOS, the user cannot choose which permissions they want to grant and which
permissions they want to deny. Moreover, the application can get the permissions
through the application signing.
The permissions have four levels, normal permissions, dangerous permissions, sig-
nature permissions and signatureOrSystem permissions. Normal permissions can be
granted automatically; dangerous permissions are inferred to those granted by the
users; signature permissions are granted within the same sandbox; signatureOrSys-
10
tem permissions are granted to pre-installed applications or the applications installed
by the root.
2.4 Android Malware
While the Android OS is increasing its market share at an amazing speed, the An-
droid malware also increase many times. The reasons may be the Android security
framework and its open source nature.
A mobile malware survey(Felt et al., 2011a) shows that the incentives for writing
malware include selling user information, stealing user credentials, making premium-
rate calls and SMS and so on.
Now the most popular method to detect malware is based on the application’s
signature, which is difficult to detect zero-day malware. In Table 2.1 shows the
malware detection results from four representative mobile anti-virus software (Table
2.1), AVG Antivirus Free v2.9 (AVG), Lookout Security & Antivirus v6.9 (Lookout),
Norton Mobile Security Lite v2.5.0.379 (Norton), and TrendMicro Mobile Security
Personal Edition v2.0.0.1294 (Trend Micro).
Detected Samples
(out of 1260)
AVG Lookout Norton Trend Micro
# 689 1003 254 966
% 54.7% 79.6% 20.2% 76.7%
Table 2.1: Detection results from four representative mobile anti-virus
software (Zhou and Jiang, 2012)
In Table 2.1, the malware dataset has 1260 unique malware samples, which is also
used in our research as malware dataset.
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2.5 Data Mining Techniques
In the malware detection area, data mining is a frequently used technique. Especially,
the classification algorithms are useful to classify an unknown application.
Classification is a supervised learning (Han et al., 2006). It has two steps. First,
it builds a model based on the training dataset which has known class labels. Then,
it uses the model to classify the new data with unknown class labels. In our research,
a class label that equals ”1” means the benign application while a class label that
equals ”2” means the malware.
In this research, we use four different classifiers in Weka (Hall et al., 2009), IBK,
J48, Logistic and JRip, respectively. These four classifiers are used to in malware
detection by many researchers.
IBK (Aha and Kibler, 1991) uses KNN (K-Nearest Neighbor) algorithm, is
a lazy learning classifier built after the training dataset has already been input. It
selects K neighbors as a group to classify. Value K is selected by experience. In our
research, we use default value ”1” for K.
J48 (Quinlan, 1993) uses the decision tree. It consists of a decision graph and
possible results. It’s readable and easy to describe. What’s more, it’s efficient since
the calculation times of each prediction are less than the depth of the decision.
Logistic (le Cessie and van Houwelingen, 1992) is a logistic regression model
which can find the relationship between the dichotomy results and its factors.
JRip (Cohen, 1995) is a propositional rule learner which repeats two stages, a
grow stage and a prune stage. In the grow stage, it will add the rule’s antecedents
until the rule is perfect. In the prune stage, it will prune each rule to some degree.
After using the classifier, two methods are generally used to test the predicted class
label. The first one is 10 fold cross-validation. The original data set is partitioned
into 90% training set and 10% test set. This process repeats 10 times. The second
12
method is that we randomly select 30% original dataset as the test set, and the rest
70% dataset are used for training.
To evaluate the performance of the built model, TPR, TNR and overall accuracy
(ACC) are used. The confusion matrix is used to help understand these measure-
ments. It’s used to show the relationship between the actual class label and the
predicted label using the built classification model in Table 2.2.
Predicted class
/Actual class
Positive Negative
Positive True Positives (TP) False Negatives (FN)
Negative False Positives (FP) True Negatives (TN)
Table 2.2: Confusion matrix
• TP: the number of the benign applications that are correctly identified.
• FP: the number of the benign applications that are identified as malware.
• TN: the number of malware that are correctly identified.
• FN: the number of malware that are identified as the benign application.
• TPR: the proportion of the benign applications that are correctly identified.
It’s also called sensitivity and recall.
TPR =
TP
P
=
TP
TP + FN
• TNR: the proportion of malware that are correctly identified. It’s also called
specificity.
TNR =
TN
N
=
TN
TN + FP
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• ACC: the proportion of the applications that are correctly identified:
ACC =
TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
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Chapter 3
Security Metrics Selection
Based on a collection of security-related paper ((Chin et al., 2011),(Bugiel et al.,
2011), (Dietz et al., 2011), (Felt et al., 2011b)...) and our previous research, we
choose four categories of metrics, the vulnerabilities, the dangerous behaviors, the
sensitive features and the application attributes to analyze the security of an An-
droid application. The malware developers can exploit the vulnerabilities exposed
by the victim applications. The dangerous behaviors can be done by the dangerous
applications. The sensitive features are used frequently in malware. The application
attributes can show the application variation trend.
3.1 Vulnerabilities
In this section we survey the Android security vulnerabilities which are identified by
many research groups. And we quantify these vulnerabilities using metrics. These
vulnerabilities may be used by other malware developers.
3.1.1 Over-privileged Permissions
An application is Over-privileged when it requests more permissions than it uses.
These extra permissions are potentially dangerous. For example, the malware may
ask for enough permissions in the initial benign version, and when it updates to the
new malicious version, it doesn’t need to ask for more permissions to do the bad
behavior, which may relax the vigilance of users.
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The Android operating system encourages the developers to follow the least-
privileged principle, but it’s not compulsive since the insufficient API documentations.
As a result, the developers themselves don’t pay much attention to it.
This metric records the count of extra permissions an application requested.
3.1.2 Open Components
Open components are public components which can be accessed by other components
or even other applications. Open components can cause intent spoofing, eavesdrop-
ping, denial of service, hijacking attack (Chin et al., 2011).
Since the default value of ”exported” in a component is ”TRUE”, if a component
is private, the developer should set the ”exported” as ”FALSE” explicitly. If the
component needs to communicate with other components with the ”exported” as
”TRUE”, it’s better to set the intent target explicitly. Otherwise, Android operating
system will decide which component should receive this intent.
This metric measures the number of open components in an application.
3.1.3 Re-delegation
Permission re-delegation is also called confused deputy attack. As in Android security
mechanism, an application can get the dangerous permissions by asking for users to
grant them. However, permission re-delegation circumvents this rule.
Re-delegation can be exploited through open components in the victim applica-
tions. It can also be used by an attacker directly. For example, they can develop a
benign application and a malicious application which share the same UID. The ma-
licious application can get all the permissions which the users granted to the benign
application.
For example, in Figure 3·1, if Eve wants to call a particular method, such as, send-
ing an SMS, the system will reject her since she doesn’t have permission. However, if
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Figure 3·1: Re-delegation
(Felt et al., 2011b)
Eve sends an intent to Alice who has the sending SMS permission, then the system
will approve Alice’s request since Alice has permission to call the method. In this
way, Eve can send an SMS without the permission.
This metric records the number of protected methods that accessed by open com-
ponents.
3.2 Dangerous Behaviors
Dangerous behaviors may lead to terrible consequence for the users. These dangerous
behaviors are caused by the applications themselves.
3.2.1 Hidden Files
An application may contain the dangerous behaviors in hidden files.
They can be detected by checking the postfix of files in the APK file structure.
The dangerous postfix contains ”bat”, ”bll” and so on.
This metric measures the number of suspicious files in an application.
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3.2.2 Dangerous Domains
The dangerous domains are identified malicious sites. The application containing
dangerous domains can push ads to the users’ devices or get the important data from
the device. Currently, there are more and more dangerous domains.
We collect 22,922 dangerous domains from the work of previous students and
check whether the APK file contains these dangerous domains.
This metric records the number of malicious sites in an application.
3.2.3 Root Exploits
A root exploit is an application is attempt to gain the root privilege so that it can go
around the Android security check. For example, the malicious application which has
root exploit can install applications on the user’s device without users’ participation,
even take control the whole device. This behavior is really extremely dangerous,
many malware contain root exploits.
This metric records the count of root exploit times of an application.
3.2.4 Code Loading
There are four types of code loading, native code loading, reflection, dynamic code
loading and crypto code loading. In malware datasets, the dynamic code loading is
used the most frequently.
Native Codes Native codes refer to the developers use of native languages, such as
C, C++ to write the Android application. It can increase the speed of the application.
Though it is packaged into an APK file and run in the virtual machine on the device,
it can also change the encryption scheme which is difficult for Android to check.
This metric is used to record the usage times the native codes in an application.
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Reflection Reflection is a method in Java, this method can be invoked dynamically.
This metric records the invoked times of reflection method in an application.
Dynamic Codes The dynamic codes can be run dynamically in an application. If
the codes are loaded from a malicious server, the consequence is serious.
This metric is defined as the number of times that dynamic codes are invoked in
an application.
Crypto Codes Crypto is a package related to application encryption and decryp-
tion in Android.
This metric records the times of crypto codes invoked in an application.
3.3 Sensitive Features
There are many sensitive APIs in Android, we choose 40 APIs and divide them into
four categories, cost-sensitive, personal information, sensitive input devices and device
metadata. We use ”1” to represent the API is used and ”0” is not used.
3.3.1 Cost-Sensitive
A cost-sensitive API is a function that may increase the users’ cost. For example,
if an application abuses the SMS function, it may use the APIs, ”sendTextMes-
sage()”, ”sendMultipartTextMessage()”, ”sendMultimediaMessage()” under the class
”android.telephony.SmsManager”.
3.3.2 Personal Information
It’s normal for an application to ask for users to share some information, even personal
information. However the malware may use these functions to look up the user’s
location, read the user’s phone and so on.
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For example, to detect location leakage, the APIs, ”GsmCellLocation/getLac()”
and ”GsmCellLocation/getCid()” are detected. To detect telephony leakage, the
methods ”getSubscriberId()”, ”getDeviceId()”, ”getLine1Number()”, ”getSimSerial-
Number()”, ”getNetworkOperator()” and ”getCellLocation()” under the class ”Tele-
phonyManager” may be used.
3.3.3 Sensitive Data Input Devices
Android allows applications to use the network, the zip files and so on. In order
to check the network, we record the APIs, ”getNetworkInfo()”, ”setWifiEnabled()”,
”getWifiState()” and so on. We also check the methods, ”read()”, ”close()” and some
other methods under the class ”java.util.zip.ZipInputStream”. These APIs are used
frequently in malware.
3.3.4 Device MetaData
In the device settings part, we check the APIs, ”getRunningServices()”, ”getMemo-
ryInfo()” and ”restartPackage()” in the class ”android.app.ActivityManager”. These
APIs can get the running services or check the application’s memory usage or kill
other processes. These methods are frequently used by malware. We also check some
application related APIs, such as ”android.content.ContentResolver” which provides
the methods to access to content providers.
3.4 Application Attributes
This section we select the attributes of the application, including the size, classes,
components, permissions. And we measure these attributes using metrics.
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3.4.1 Application Size
Application size is a metric that records the size of the APK file. The unit in this
research is kilobytes.
3.4.2 Application Classes
Application class count is a metric that counts the number of classes in an APK file.
3.4.3 Application Components
Application component count is a metric that counts the number of components used
in an APK file.
3.4.4 Permissions
Permission contains two kinds of metrics.
Requested permission is a metric that counts the number of permissions re-
quested which are declaimed in the manifest file of an application.
Used permission is a metric that counts the number of permissions used in an
application, usually through API calls.
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Chapter 4
Cross-Versions Analysis Tool
Cross-versions analysis tool is implemented to analyze the security of Android appli-
cations and compare the differences in multiple versions of an application. This tool
is based on previous students’ works (Nebiyu Feleke, 2014), we modify and extend
the tool to fulfill the requirements of our research. The framework of the tool for our
project is in Figure 4·1.
Figure 4·1: Cross-versions analysis tool framework
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4.1 Collecting Data
To collect enough applications to analyze, we use two crawlers to download the appli-
cations from the Google Play market and from the third-party market called anzhi.
We collect malware from the Genome Project(Zhou and Jiang, 2012).
The crawler module is used to download the applications from the market au-
tomatically. The first crawler is powered by (Alexandre, ) which is an open source
library. It’s a Java based tool and used to download the applications from the official
market. We use this crawler to download thousands of applications.
The second crawler is powered by (Sun, ). It’s an extensible crawler for down-
loading Android applications in third-party markets. It’s a Python based tool that it
uses the downloaded url addresses of the applications to download the applications
into the repository. We choose a Chinese third-party market, called anzhi, to down-
load the applications. We choose anzhi as the third-party market since it provides
multiple versions of each application, it helps us to analyze the application evolution.
However, this crawler can only download the latest version of each application, so we
modified the crawler to download multiple versions of each application. We download
more than 5000 applications using this crawler, among them, nearly 900 applications
have multiple versions.
We contacted the authors’ of (Zhou and Jiang, 2012) and were granted the per-
missions to access the malware database. We downloaded around 1500 malware from
their database.
4.2 Extractor
The extractor module extracts the security parameters of each application’s APK file.
It includes a collection of scripts.
The extractor module is based on the Androguard tool (Desnos, 2011). The
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Androguard tool is a python powered tool that reverse engineers APK files from
DEX/ODEX/APK/AXML/ARSC format into full Python objects. Its open source
nature enables developers to customize the static analysis.
Before extracting the security parameters, the applications from the Google Play
and from the third-party market are renamed to include both the package name and
its version. For example, ”xxx.apk” will be called ”xxx-1.0.apk” after renaming,
”xxx” is its package name and ”1.0” is its version.
Based on Androguard, we developed a collection of scripts explained below:
1. Over-privileged Script: checks the requested permissions which are declaimed
in manifest files and gets the used permissions in the Dalvik code. It lists the
permissions which are in the requested permissions list but not in the used per-
missions list, then counts them. This script stores the application name and
the number of permissions that are unused in an application in the .csv file.
2. Open Component Script: reads the component information from the man-
ifest files. If the component doesn’t set the ”exported” value as ”FALSE” ex-
plicitly, the open component count adds ”1”. This script stores the application
name and the count of open components in the .csv file.
3. Re-delegation Script: gets the implicit open components from the manifest
files and checks in the Dalvik code if any component is making a call to the
protected methods.(Nebiyu Feleke, 2014) If it does, the number of re-delegation
of this application increases ”1”. This script stores the application name and
the count of re-delegations of each application in the .csv file.
4. Hidden File Script: checks the files from the manifest files, if the file has
the suffix, such as ”bat”,”chm” and so on, the count of hidden files adds ”1”.
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This script stores the application name and the count of hidden files of each
application in the .csv file.
5. Malicious Domain Script: checks the strings from the Dalvik code. We
get a malicious domains list from previous work, if any string in the malicious
domains list, the malicious domain count increases ”1”. This script stores the
application name and the number of malicious domains in an application in the
.csv file.
6. Root Exploit Script: checks the strings in the Dalvik code, if a string contains
”test-keys”,”release-keys” or ”su”, or it starts with ”su”, ”/system/” or ”busy-
box”, this string is considered as containing the root exploit. This script stores
the application name and the number of root exploit strings in an application
in the .csv file.
7. Code Loading Script: searches the methods to check the native
code loading, dynamic code loading, refection, crypto code loading in
Dalvik code. To detect the dynamic code loading, it searches the class
”dalvik/system/DexClassLoader;”, and returns this class usage time. To de-
tect the reflection, the script searches the class ”java/lang/reflect/Method;”
and also returns the usage times. To detect the crypto code loading, the script
searches the class ”javax/crypto/.”, and record the usage times. This script
stores the application name and the counts of native code loading, dynamic
code loading, reflection and crypto code loading in the .csv file.
8. Sensitive API Script: checks the Dalvik code to see whether the application
uses the 40 sensitive APIs defined previously. If the application uses one of
the sensitive APIs, the corresponding sensitive API’s value sets ”1”, if not, the
value sets ”0”. This script stores the application name and the sensitive APIs
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usage in the .csv file.
9. Size Script: returns the application name and the size of each APK file and
stores in the .csv file.
10. Component Script: reads the component defined in the manifest files. This
script returns the application name and the number of components of an appli-
cation in .csv file.
11. Class Script: searches the class information in the Dalvik code and returns
the application name and the count of class in an application in .csv file.
12. Permission Script: checks the requested permissions which declaimed in man-
ifest files and gets the used permissions in the Dalvik code. This script returns
the application name, the number of the requested permissions, the used permis-
sions, the list of the requested permissions and the list of the used permissions
and stores as the .csv file.
13. Requested Permission Script: checks the manifest file to see whether the
application requests the top 40 permissions. These permissions are extracted
from the permissions-based malware detection module. If the application uses
one of the top permissions, the corresponding permission’s value set to be ”1”,
else, the value set to be ”0”. This script shows the application name and the
top requested permissions usage and stores in the .csv file.
4.3 Analysis
The analysis module is used to analyze the application evolution and finish the
preparatory work for malware detection and update attack detection.
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Application Evolution Module To analyze the application evolution, we choose
the applications which have multiple versions. This module collects a number of
metrics, the vulnerabilities, the dangerous behaviors and the application attributes.
After that, the latest version subtracts the corresponding value of the previous version.
This module gets the result and records the change of each application which has
multiple versions and stores the results in the .csv file.
Permissions-based Malware Detection Module This module consists of the
following steps:
1. We use the permission script to get all the requested permissions in the malware
dataset. These requested permissions are used as a vector list.
2. For an application, if it requests the permissions listed in the vector list, the
corresponding value is set to ”1”, else to ”0”. For example, if the application
uses the first and the third permissions, it can be indicated as ”1,0,1,0,0,0,0...”
3. If the application is from Google Play, we assume that it is the legitimate appli-
cation, and we use ”1” to represent a benign application. This value will append
the previous number list. If the application is from the malware dataset, the
appended number will be ”2”. If the application which we take as an example
previously is from Google Play, now it can be indicated as ”1,0,1,0,0,0,0,...,1”;
if it’s from malware dataset, it can be shown as ”1,0,1,0,0,0,0,...,2”.
4. The .csv file format converts to the .arff file that can be read in Weka. The last
column is the class label.
The same steps are followed for the used permissions.
In the second step, we can also get the percentage difference of each permission
in malware and benign applications. Then we rank the percentage difference to get a
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ranked permission list. The top 40 permissions which are used as feature vectors in
the following modules are selected here.
Multiple Metrics Malware Detection Module This module collects the data
of the vulnerabilities, the dangerous behaviors, the sensitive APIs and the top 40
permissions of each application. If the application is from Google Play or the third-
party market, they are considered as legitimate applications, and the class label will
be ”1”. If the application is from malware dataset, the class label will be ”2”.
Update Attack Detection Module This module collects the metrics of vulnera-
bilities, the dangerous behaviors, the sensitive APIs, the top 40 requested permissions
and the application attributes. However, the metrics used in this module are the dif-
ference value between the new version and the old version of an application. The
class labels are the same as those defined in the multiple metrics malware detection
module.
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Chapter 5
Application Evolution
To analyze the application evolution, the application evolution module analyzes 292
applications with two versions from Google Play and 886 applications with two ver-
sions from the third-party market. Each application was checked for the vulnerabili-
ties, the dangerous behaviors and the application metadata.
To show the evolution more clearly, we show each metric in the initial version in
Figure 5·1 and the change in the new version in Figure 5·2. These two figures are
using the mean value of each metrics to do the comparison.
From Figure 5·1, we can see that the applications from the Google Play or the
third-party market have the vulnerabilities and the dangerous behaviors. Some met-
rics, such as hidden files or root exploits, illustrate the applications from Google Play
are less dangerous than those from the third-party market. However, we cannot easily
conclude that the applications from the third-party are worse than those from Google
Play. For example, the applications from Google Play are more frequently using the
dynamic codes, a very potentially dangerous behavior, than the applications from the
third-party market.
From Figure 5·2, we can see not all metrics are less in the updated version. Re-
delegation and native code-loading are less not only in the official market, but also
in the third-party market. The values of the rest metrics are increased or decreased
slightly. However, this figure can only give an initial impression since the application
evolution can be more precisely described when compared with the old version.
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Figure 5·1: Application evolution original metrics
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Figure 5·2: Variation in application evolution
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In the following sections, we analyze each metric in details. From Table 5.1, Table
5.2 and Table 5.3, we list the change across the versions. The ”decreased” column
means that the percentage of applications delete or decrease the corresponding metric.
The ”increased” column shows that the percentage of applications have more count
of that metric. The ”same” means that both versions have this metric and this metric
stayed the same in the updated version. The ”zero” shows the percentage of both
version without such metrics.
5.1 Vulnerabilities Analysis
From Table 5.1, we can see that these vulnerabilities frequently happen in most
applications, regardless if they are from the official market or the third-party market.
Vulnerability Market Decreased Increased Same Zero
Over-privileged Google Play 5% 11% 73% 11%
Third-party Market 17% 38% 45% 0%
Open components Google Play 4% 13% 83% 0%
Third-party Market 13% 37% 44% 6%
Re-delegation Google Play 51% 9% 14% 26%
Third-party Market 30% 12% 38% 20%
Table 5.1: Vulnerabilities evolution analysis
Over-privileged permissions metric is also not optimistic. 11% of applications from
the Google Play and 38% of applications from the third-party market have more
extra permissions in the new version. While 73% of applications from the Google
Play and 45% of applications from the third-party market remain the same in the
new versions of applications. The developers may have benign purpose, such as more
convenience, they ask more permissions than they use. However, it’s not suitable
32
since the malicious developers may use this method to harm the users. What’s more,
Android also encourages the developers to follow the least-privileged permissions rule.
Open components are less optimistic than re-delegation. 83% of applications
from the Google Play and 44% of applications from the third-party suffers from this
vulnerability and have no change in the updated version. Open components may be
not brought to the attention, since the default value of the component is ”TRUE”,
most developers don’t get used to modify it to ”FALSE” manually.
More than half applications from the official market decrease the value of re-
delegation in the updated version, it can be inferred that re-delegation has already
been detected and the developers have tried to fix this vulnerability in the updated
version. However, 30% of the applications from the third-party market have less re-
delegation and 38% of which suffer from the re-delegation don’t change in the new
version. The improvement in the third-party is less obvious than that in the Google
Play. What’s more, we cannot ignore the problem of re-delegation, since only 26%
of applications from the Google Play and 20% of applications from the third-party
market are without re-delegation in the whole update process.
5.2 Dangerous Behaviors Analysis
From Table 5.2, most applications don’t have dangerous behaviors, since the dan-
gerous behaviors are different from the vulnerabilities. The dangerous behaviors are
frequently contained in the malware, it can be more severe than the vulnerabilities.
We can also see that the deleted rate and the added rate in the third-party market
are higher than those in the official market, which means that the third-party market
is less stable than the official market.
Hidden files are used more frequently in the applications from the third-party
market when compared to Google Play. Only few applications have less hidden files
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Dangerous be-
haviors
Market Decreased Increased Same Zero
Hidden files Google Play 1% 2% 13% 84%
Third-party Market 4% 7% 19% 70%
Dangerous do-
mains
Google Play 2% 1% 7% 90%
Third-party Market 1% 0% 2% 97%
Root exploits Google Play 3% 4% 27% 66%
Third-party Market 8% 18% 28% 46%
Native codes Google Play 5% 7% 28% 61%
Third-party Market 16% 32% 34% 18%
Reflection Google Play 12% 30% 53% 5%
Third-party Market 19% 41% 33% 7%
Dynamic codes Google Play 2% 13% 35% 50%
Third-party Market 7% 12% 22% 59%
Crypto codes Google Play 3% 13% 64% 20%
Third-party Market 14% 33% 37% 16%
Table 5.2: Dangerous behaviors evolution analysis
in their updated versions. However, 7% of applications from the third-party increase
the value of this dangerous behavior in the updated version, which is really worse.
Dangerous domains are rare in the both markets. Most applications don’t change
the dangerous domains in the updated version. The reason is that, the dangerous do-
mains are the identified malicious sites. The official market or the third-party market
may delete the applications which contained these identified malicious domains from
the markets once they detect them.
Root exploits are a dangerous behavior which is applied in most malware. The
applications from the third-party market increase or decrease the root exploit counts
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more frequently than the applications from Google Play. For example, 18% of ap-
plications from the third-party market have more root exploits while only 4% of
applications from Google Play increase the count of root exploit.
Code loading is more serious in the third-party market than in the Google Play.
Though the percentage of decreasing the count of code loading in the third-party
market is higher than that in the Google Play, the percentage of increasing is also
higher in the third-party market.
5.3 Application Attributes Analysis
Metadata Market Decreased Increased Same
Requested permissions Google Play 5% 13% 81%
Third-party Market 13% 45% 42%
Used permissions Google Play 9% 21% 70%
Third-party Market 14% 38% 48%
Classes Google Play 16% 56% 28%
Third-party Market 19% 64% 17%
Components Google Play 9% 26% 65%
Third-party Market 17% 54% 29%
Size Google Play 19% 56% 25%
Third-party Market 25% 65% 10%
Table 5.3: Application metadata evolution analysis
From Table 5.3, we can also see that the percentage of the metrics changed are
higher in the third-party market.
In terms of permissions, the requested permissions and the used permissions have
more in the new versions of applications from the third-party market. Most applica-
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tions from the official market don’t change the permissions in the updated version.
The classes count, the component count and the size of the most applications
tend to have more in the updated version. This may be the result of the functionality
development of applications. And these three metrics are related to each other.
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Chapter 6
Permissions-based Malware Detection
Android’s permission model has its advantages and shortcomings. Most malware need
to request and use some permissions to achieve their malicious goals. As a result,
permissions are useful features in malware detection.
We propose to use machine learning classifiers to detect the malware based on
the application permissions. We compare the performance of the requested permis-
sions and the used permissions by using four classifiers. The result is that the best
performances of using the requested permissions and using the used permissions are
similar.
6.1 Approach Overview
Our goal is to build a model which can distinguish the malware from the benign
applications efficiently based on Android permissions. We find that the requested
permissions are not always the same as the used permissions. We cannot reach a
conclusion arbitrarily as to whether the best results are achieved from looking at
the requested permissions or the used permissions. As a result, we compare the
performance of using the requested permissions with the used permissions.
For each requested permissions collected from malware dataset, we calculate the
percentage difference between malware and the legitimate application dataset, and
order them based on this value. The percentage is calculated as the number of
applications requested this permission over the total number of applications in the
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dataset.
In the same way, we get the percentage difference of the used permissions.
6.2 Dataset
Our data set consists of malware dataset and benign application dataset. The malware
dataset has 1247 malware samples from Genome Project (Zhou and Jiang, 2012). And
the benign applications consist of 1514 applications downloaded from five categories
in Google Play. 528 apps are from the business category, 272 apps are from the finance
category, 265 apps are from the health and fitness category, 33 apps come from the
shopping category and 416 apps are from the application widgets category.
6.3 Feature Vectors
The requested permissions are extracted from each application’s manifest file. The
used permissions are extracted from .dex file.
102 different permissions are requested by the malware in our malware dataset.
Instead of choosing the top permissions requested in malware, we rank the permissions
by the percentage difference between malware and benign applications, because many
permissions are requested frequently not only in the malware but also in the benign
apps. For example, 97.67% malware request INTERNET permission while 94.98%
benign apps also request this permission. Our aim is to use these permissions to
classify the malware and benign ones and we want to find the difference between
them, ranking difference value is better than only ranking the top frequently requested
permissions in the malware. Table 6.1 shows the top 20 requested permissions with
the highest percentage difference in malware and benign samples.
There are only 33 permissions used in malware. Table 6.2 depicts the top 20
difference value of used permissions in malware and benign samples.
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Permission Malware
rate
Goodware
rate
Difference
READ SMS 63.35% 5.88% 57.47%
WRITE SMS 52.77% 3.90% 48.87%
READ PHONE STATE 93.50% 47.03% 46.47%
SEND SMS 42.82% 6.74% 36.08%
RECEIVE SMS 38.97% 6.61% 32.36%
GET ACCOUNTS 4.09% 35.67% 31.58%
CAMERA 1.52% 31.24% 29.72%
RECEIVE BOOT COMPLETED 55.17% 27.15% 28.02%
ACCESS WIFI STATE 64.47% 36.46% 28.01%
WRITE APN SETTINGS 27.99% 1.06% 26.93%
RESTART PACKAGES 26.70% 3.96% 22.74%
CHANGE WIFI STATE 31.92% 9.71% 22.21%
WRITE CONTACTS 29.99% 9.05% 20.94%
INSTALL PACKAGES 20.05% 0.73% 19.32%
CALL PHONE 34.00% 14.99% 19.01%
BILLING 0.08% 17.31% 17.23%
READ CONTACTS 36.65% 21.00% 15.65%
WAKE LOCK 34.00% 49.08% 15.08%
DISABLE KEYGUARD 19.81% 4.95% 14.86%
READ LOGS 19.25% 7.73% 11.52%
Table 6.1: 20 requested permissions with the highest percentage dif-
ference in malware and benign applications
39
Permission Malware
rate
Goodware
rate
Difference
READ CONTACTS 18.85% 71.00% 52.15%
FACTORY TEST 25.18% 69.88% 44.70%
WAKE LOCK 31.11% 74.17% 43.06%
USE CREDENTIALS 0.08% 35.14% 35.06%
READ PHONE STATE 94.87% 62.02% 32.85%
SEND SMS 34.16% 5.35% 28.81%
CAMERA 1.36% 29.66% 28.30%
GET ACCOUNTS 4.25% 29.85% 25.60%
VIBRATE 71.21% 92.60% 21.39%
ACCESS COARSE LOCATION 29.27% 8.45% 20.82%
ACCESS FINE LOCATION 44.35% 64.80% 20.45%
RECORD AUDIO 2.65% 20.21% 17.56%
BLUETOOTH 0.56% 17.64% 17.08%
READ LOGS 50.84% 34.54% 16.30%
ACCESS NETWORK STATE 81.64% 93.33% 11.69%
CHANGE COMPONENT ENABLED STATE 7.22% 11.29% 10.57%
CHANGE WIFI STATE 0.08% 8.98% 8.90%
RESTART PACKAGES 9.94% 3.37% 6.57%
MODIFY AUDIO SETTINGS 0.48% 6.87% 6.39%
WRITE SETTINGS 2.65% 8.78% 6.13%
Table 6.2: 20 used permissions with the highest percentage difference
in malware and benign applications
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6.4 Classifiers Performance
We compare the classifiers performances using the requested permissions with the
used permissions in this section.
We use four classifiers to compare the performance. They are IBK, J48, Logistic
and JRip. We use 10 times cross-validation method to do the test. The performance
is evaluated by the accuracy, TPR and TNR.
We found 102 requested permissions in the malware dataset. Each time we add 10
more permissions as the feature vectors to build the model. The requested permissions
performance with the highest percentage difference is illustrated in Figure 6·1, Figure
6·2 and Figure 6·3.
Figure 6·1: Accuracy of using the requested permissions
Figure 6·1 shows that classifier IBK always has higher accuracy than other clas-
sifiers. The highest accuracy is achieved at 96.5% when almost 40 or more than 80
permissions are used.
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Figure 6·2: TPR of using the requested permissions
Figure 6·3: TNR of using the requested permissions
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Figure 6·2 shows that the classifiers have a stable TPR when top 30 permissions
are selected and the TPR is more than 95% after that. The IBK has the highest TPR
which is 97.6% when top 30 permissions are used as feature vectors. Figure 6·3 shows
that the IBK also has the highest TNR, which is 95.5% when the top 40 permissions
are selected.
In this case, it’s obvious that the classifier IBK has a better performance than other
classifiers. And since more feature vectors are selected, the time of building model will
take longer time, there’s a tradeoff between accuracy, TPR and TNR. From Figure
6·1, Figure 6·2 and Figure 6·3, we could conclude that top 40 permissions are the best
option. Although top 80, 90 and 100 permissions have the similar performance with
top 40 permissions, using 40 features vectors are less time-consuming.
We found only 34 used permissions in the malware dataset. Each time we add 5
more permissions as the feature vectors to build the classification model. The used
permissions performance with the highest percentage difference is shown in Figure
6·4, Figure 6·5 and Figure 6·6.
Figure 6·4 illustrates that the classifier IBK has the best performance in terms of
accuracy. When the top 25 permissions are used as feature vectors, the accuracy of
IBK is 96.5%, which is the highest one. When more feature vectors are selected, the
accuracy, however, decreases.
Figure 6·5 shows that the classifier Logistic has the best sensitivity at first, how-
ever, classifier IBK gets the highest sensitivity (97.2%) at top 25 permissions. In
Figure 6·6, classifier IBK gets the highest specificity (95.7%) when the top 25 per-
missions are used.
There’s no doubt that classifier IBK with the top 25 permissions are the first
choice when using the used permissions to build the classification model.
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Figure 6·4: Accuracy of using the used permissions
Figure 6·5: TPR of using the used permissions
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Figure 6·6: TNR of using the used permissions
6.5 Comparison
In this section, we compare the requested permissions with the used permissions when
they have the best performance. The same point is that they are both using classifier
IBK, the difference is that the requested permissions use the top 40 while the used
permissions use the top 25.
Figure 6·7 illustrates the best performance of using the requested permissions and
the used permissions. From the figure, we can see that they have the same TPR. The
used permissions have higher TNR, but lower accuracy. Although higher TNR means
that this model can classify malware more precisely, we argue that the requested per-
mission is the better choice for two reasons. First, the TNR of these two models is
approximate, the difference is only 0.2%. Second, the requested permissions are ex-
tracted from manifest files, which is much faster than extracting the used permissions
from the .dex files. Furthermore, if an application only uses the documented API,
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about 18%-26% of the non-system permissions can be hidden(Au et al., 2012), but
the used permissions are extracted from the API calls in Androguard (Desnos, 2011),
this is also a reason why only 34 kinds of permissions are found in malware. As a
result, if we want to use the used permissions, the APIs would be a better option.
Figure 6·7: Performance comparison between the requested permis-
sions and the used permissions
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Chapter 7
Multiple Metrics Malware Detection
Chapter 6 shows the performance of only using permissions, the results still have
space to improve, as a result, in this chapter, we use multiple metrics to detect
malware. The metrics we defined in Chapter 3 are used as the feature vectors. After
this, we build the models to classify the malware and legitimate applications by using
four different classification algorithms. For each model, we compare the performance
among the Google Play applications with malware, the third-party applications with
malware and their combination with malware.
7.1 Approach Overview
Our goal is to build a model which has a better performance to classify the malicious
applications from the benign applications. As a result, we come up with the idea
that using multiple security metrics to do the classification instead of only using
permissions.
Each application is represented by a list of numbers. Each number is the count of
the corresponding security metric or whether that metric is used in the application.
Then each application is marked by a class label, the legitimate applications are
labeled as ”1” and the malware are labeled as ”2”. Then we use these metrics as
feature vectors to do the classification. Four classifiers (J48, Logistic Regression, IBK
and JRip) are chosen to build the models. At last, we evaluate the performance of
each classifier by accuracy, TPR and TNR.
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7.2 Dataset
The dataset consists of malware samples, applications from the Google Play and the
applications from the third-party market.
In order to have a better comparison with the permissions-based malware detec-
tion, we use the same applications (1514) from the Google Play and the same malware
samples (1247). We import the third-party market in multiple metrics malware de-
tection part, and 3822 applications are selected.
We assume that the applications from the Google Play and the third-party market
are legitimate applications, their class labels are ”1”. The malware samples are all
malicious, their class labels are ”2”.
7.3 Feature Vectors
The vulnerabilities, the dangerous behaviors, the sensitive API and the top requested
permissions are selected as the feature vectors. We exclude the application metadata
in the multiple metrics malware detection, since the size of malware is much smaller
than that of normal applications, as a result, the component count and the class count
in malware are also much less than those in normal applications. It would skew the
results of the classification and would lead to bias.
In the selected metrics, there are 3 feature vectors belonging to the vulnerabilities,
they are re-delegation, open components and over-privileged permissions. There are
7 feature vectors belonging to the dangerous behaviors, they are hidden files, root ex-
ploits, dangerous domains, native code loading, dynamic code loading, reflection and
crypto code loading. There are 40 sensitive APIs related to cost, personal informa-
tion, data input devices or device metadata. And there are 40 requested permissions
are selected. These 40 permissions are chosen in the permissions-based malware de-
tection part. The best performance of using requested permissions is when the top
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requested 40 permissions are chosen. They are ranked by the percentage difference
between malware and legitimate applications.
7.4 Classifiers Performance
Four classifiers are used to build the models. They are J48, Logistic Regression, IBK
and JRip, respectively. For each model, the performance is evaluated by accuracy,
TPR and TNR.
We have three experiments, the first one we compare the Goople Play applications
with the malware. The second one we compare the third-party applications with the
malware. The third one we compare the applications from Google Play and the third-
party market with the malware, which are shown in Figure 7·1, Figure 7·2 and Figure
7·3.
Figure 7·1: Accuracy of multiple metrics malware detection
In Figure 7·1, IBK has the best accuracy no matter in which markets. And in
every market, the accuracy is almost the same by using the IBK classifier, which
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Figure 7·2: TPR of multiple metrics malware detection
Figure 7·3: TNR of multiple metrics malware detection
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is 99.3% (in the both markets, the accuracy is 99.4%). What’s more, the lowest
accuracy is 97.9% in the third-party market by using JRip, however, this accuracy is
still higher than the best accuracy of only using permissions as the feature vectors.
In Figure 7·2, IBK classifier has no doubt to have the best TPR, the value is 99.6%.
In Figure 7·3, IBK classifier also has the best TNR, the value is about 99%, which
means this model can distinguish the malware from unknown application dataset
exactly.
7.5 Comparison
In this section, we compare the multiple metrics with the requested permissions. In
Figure 7·4, the applications are from the Google Play and malware dataset, while in
the requested permissions, the result is the best performance that uses the top 40
permissions. We can easily conclude that using multiple metrics can achieve a much
better performance than using the permissions only, no matter in terms of accuracy,
TPR or TNR. Especially, the TNR increases most, which means that using multiple
metrics can classify the malware more precisely.
There are three reasons which make using multiple metrics having a better per-
formance, first, while we use multiple metrics, we contain the top 40 requested per-
missions, in other words, we select more feature vectors to build the classification
models. Second, from the used permissions malware detection, we know that less
used permissions can have the similar performance with that using requested permis-
sions. However, given the lack of API documentation, we use the API instead of using
the used permissions. Third, the dangerous behaviors help to classify the malware,
since malware has more dangerous behaviors than the normal applications.
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Figure 7·4: Performance comparison between using multiple metrics
and the requested permissions
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Chapter 8
Update Attack Detection
When we investigate the Android application evolution, security may not be enhanced
in the new version of an application. This phenomenon leads us to pay attention on
update attack. Update attack is a new type of attack where the malicious code is
contained in the update components of a legitimate application. It is easy to carry out
because users don’t tend to question the legitimacy of updates for already-installed
software.
In this chapter, we implement two test experiments to see the update attack
detection performance using machine learning techniques.
8.1 Approach Overview
To detect update attack, we conduct the experiments from two directions.
First, we use the old versions of the applications and 70% malware as the training
dataset. We use the new versions of the applications and 30% malware as the test
dataset. The feature vectors are the same as those in multiple metrics malware
detection.
For second experiment, we use the difference values of each metric as the feature
vectors. This experiment tends to detect update attacks, since if the malware is
contained in the new version of an application, the difference values of metrics will
be similar to the original values of metrics in malware.
Both experiments have four classifiers to do the classification. Accuracy, TPR
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and TNR are used to evaluate the performance of each classifier.
8.2 Dataset
We collect 292 applications with two versions of the Google Play and 886 applications
with two versions from the third-party market. In the malware dataset, we have 1247
malware samples.
In the first experiment, The applications of the old version and 70% malware
consist of the training dataset. The applications of the new version and the rest
malware are used as the test dataset.
In the second experiment, 70% applications from the Google Play or the third-
party market and 70% malware are used as the training dataset. The test dataset is
consisted of the rest applications and the rest malware.
8.3 Feature Vectors
In the first experiment, the feature vectors are totally the same as those in the mul-
tiple metrics malware detection. The feature vectors include the vulnerabilities, the
dangerous behaviors, the sensitive APIs and 40 requested permissions with the highest
percentage difference in malware and benign applications.
However, in the second experiment, the feature vectors include the vulnerabilities,
the dangerous behaviors, the sensitive APIs, the requested permissions in malware
and the application metadata. We use the difference value between the two versions
of an application to represent each metric in the vulnerabilities and the dangerous
behaviors categories. Since we use ”0” and ”1” to represent the sensitive APIs and
permissions in previous experiments, in order to show the change, we use ”1” to
represent if the metric in the old versions is ”0” and the metric in the new version is
”1”, otherwise, the metric is ”0”. In this experiment, we add the application metadata
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as feature vectors, since the different values between versions is comparable to the
metadata in malware. For example, if malware is inserted into the new version of an
application, the difference value of size is almost the same of that malware size.
8.4 Classifiers Performance
We use four classifiers to compare the performance, J48, Logistic Regression, IBK
and JRip. We also compare the performance of different sources, the Google Play,
the third-party market and their combination. For each model, accuracy, TPR and
TNR are used to evaluate the classification performance.
Figure 8·1, Figure 8·2 and Figure 8·3 show the first update attack detection ex-
periment result.
Figure 8·1: Accuracy of update attack detection (the first experiment)
In Figure 8·1, the IBK classifier has the best accuracy, which are 99.1% and 99.6%
in the Google Play market and the third-party market.
In Figure 8·2, the IBK classifier also has an average best TPR. However, we can
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Figure 8·2: TPR of update attack detection (the first experiment)
Figure 8·3: TNR of update attack detection (the first experiment)
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find the performance in the third-party market is better than in the Google Play. The
sample number may cause this because the application number of the third-party is
4 times larger than the application number from the Google Play. Figure 8·3, the
TNR reaches ”1” when the classifier is the IBK and the market is Google Play. This
implies that this model can classify all the malware from the unknown applications
dataset.
Figure 8·4, Figure 8·5 and Figure 8·6 show the second update attack detection
experiment result.
Figure 8·4: Accuracy of update attack detection (the second experi-
ment)
Figure 8·4 illustrates the applications from Google Play always have a better accu-
racy than the applications from third-party market (99.3% and 98.8%, respectively).
The IBK classifier always has the best accuracy than other classifiers.
In Figure 8·5, the applications from the third-party market have a better TPR
than the Google Play when the classifier is the IBK. The reason may be the same
as in the first experiment. In Figure 8·6, the highest TNR is 1 when the classifier is
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Figure 8·5: TPR of update attack detection (the second experiment)
Figure 8·6: TNR of update attack detection (the second experiment)
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the JRip and the market is Google Play, however, the average best TNR is using the
IBK classifier, which is 99.7% and 98.9% while the markets are Google Play and the
third-party market.
8.5 Comparison
In this section, we compare performance of the two experiments to detect update
attack with using multiple metrics to detect malware. In Figure 8·7, the performances
are using the Google Play applications and malware with the classifier IBK. The
accuracy and TPR of the two experiments are similar which using multiple metrics
is better. However, the TNR of the two experiments are better than using multiple
metrics, particularly, the TNR of the first experiment reaches to ”1”.
Figure 8·7: Performance comparison between update attack detection
and using multiple metrics
Though the accuracy and TPR of using the multiple metrics are better than the
update attack detection, we argue that the update attack detection improves the per-
formance of using the multiple metrics for the following reasons. It’s the imbalanced
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benign samples. More than 1000 Google Play applications train the model of using
multiple metrics while around 200 Google Play applications train the model of two
experiments. If a benign application is tested as the malware, the accuracy and TPR
will decrease. As a result, if the samples are small, it’s difficult to achieve a higher
TPR, which will effect the accuracy. Moreover, we assume that the applications from
the official market and the third-party market are benign. However, we don’t know
these applications are really benign or not. So in this model, it’s hard to conclude
it’s true that the benign application is misclassified as the malware. As a result, the
TPR and accuracy are not fair to evaluate the performance. Nevertheless, the TNR
can evaluate the performance more reasonable since the malware are identified by the
research groups and the malware samples of these three are the same. It proves that
the update attack detection can have a better performance to classify the malware
than using the multiple metrics to detect malware.
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Chapter 9
Related work
9.1 Android Security
The Android security issue is always on the spotlight, many research groups try to
find and solve the security problems. Comdroid(Chin et al., 2011) talks about if the
intent doesn’t identify the recipient or the sender, it may be intercepted or suffer
from spoofing attacks. XmanDroid(Bugiel et al., 2011), Quire(Dietz et al., 2011)
and IPCInspection(Felt et al., 2011b) use different methods to solve re-delegation.
Kirin(Enck et al., 2009) finds several dangerous permissions combinations. (Davi
et al., 2011) try to overcome the over-privileged permissions. These papers identify
many vulnerabilities, we define some of them as the metrics used in our research.
A few papers discuss the Android security evolution. The paper (Wei et al., 2012)
studies the evolution of the Android ecosystem to understand whether the permission
model is allowing the platform and its applications to become more secure. While in
our paper, we use multiple categories metrics to define the security evolution, include
the vulnerabilities, the malicious behaviors and the application metadata.
9.2 Malware Detection Using Data Mining
Data mining techniques are widely used in malware detection. While (Sami et al.,
2010), (Wang et al., 2003) and (Kolter and Maloof, 2004) apply data mining to
detect the malware in Windows operating system, we use data mining techniques in
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the Android OS.
In the paper (Aung and Zaw, 2013), the authors list all the requested permissions
as the feature vectors to detect the Android malware. They compare the performances
of three classifiers. While we also use classification algorithms to classify the malware,
however, we not only use the requested permissions, but also use the used permissions.
Moreover, we ranked the permissions by the percentage difference between malware
and benign applications. Finally, we find using 40 requested permissions with the
highest percentage difference can get the best performance.
In the paper (Aafer et al., 2013), the authors use the APIs as the feature vectors
to do the classifications in the Android market. Different from their work, we not only
use the APIs and the requested permissions but also use the application vulnerabilities
and its malicious behaviors as the feature vectors. In our research, we select 90 feature
vectors while they choose 169 feature vectors, which means that our model takes less
time to build.
In the paper (Yerima et al., 2013), they use Bayesian classification to detect the
Android malware detection. They choose the permissions and the API as the feature
vectors. While we use four different classifiers and compare their performances.
The performance comparison is shown in the Table 9.1. The first two results are
from others research. The rest two are from our research.
Research Group Accuracy TPR TNR
(Aung and Zaw, 2013) 91.58% 0.916 0.916
(Aafer et al., 2013) 99% 0.999 0.978
(Yerima et al., 2013) 92.1% 0.906 0.937
Permission-based 96.5% 0.972 0.955
Multiple metrics 99.3% 0.995 0.99
Table 9.1: Performance comparison among different research groups
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9.3 Update Attack
Zhou(Zhou and Jiang, 2012) says that more recent Android malware families are
adopting update attacks and drive-by downloads to infect users. Update attack de-
tection is more tricky than common malware detection. Now the most popular way
to detect malware is to use the signature, which is not susceptible to update attack
detection.
In the paper (Tenenboim-Chekina et al., 2013), the authors use network behavioral
analysis to identify the update attack. However, in our research, we use data mining
techniques to detect the update attack. We have two ideas about detecting the update
attack. For a single application, we get the difference between the versions, then use
this difference to compare with the malware. If we have a bunch of old versions of
the applications and malware, we use the new versions of the applications as the test
dataset to detect the update attack.
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Chapter 10
Future work
To analyze the application evolution, currently, we only use the number to represent
each metric in vulnerabilities and malicious behaviors and use subtraction to get the
result. In the future, we can get the details of each metric, then compare this metric
in different versions to see the modification.
Since we get the best performance in multiple metrics malware detection. We can
find more metrics related to vulnerabilities and malicious behaviors to increase the
performance of the classification model.
We tried to get a basic idea of update attacks in this research. In the future,
it’s planned to pay more attention to the modified parts between versions of an
application. Then the metrics extract from the modified parts instead of from the
whole APK files.
In the malware detection part, the accuracy, TPR and TNR are already high
enough. However, we need to pay more attention for the false classifications and find
out the deep reasons.
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Chapter 11
Conclusion
To analyze the application evolution, we find that the security of applications doesn’t
increase with the development of the applications. Even as the applications expose
more security issues than the previous versions, regardless of whether the applications
are from the Google Play or from the third-party market.
In permissions-based malware detection, the permissions which are used more
frequently in malware are listed. The performances of using the requested permissions
or the used permissions are similar. However, using the requested permissions will be
faster and can be used precisely.
In multiple metrics malware detection, the performance is much better than only
using permissions. Furthermore, the model can be used to predict whether the un-
known applications are benign applications or malware by using the vulnerabilities,
the malicious behaviors, the sensitive APIs and the permissions requested.
Finally, in the update attack detection, we present the classification models by
using the difference values of metrics between versions of an application. The clas-
sification models are effective to detect the update attack detection, especially the
ability of detecting applications which contain malware in the new version.
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